The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation by Hylton, Keith
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
10-2011 
The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation 
Keith Hylton 
Boston Univeristy School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Keith Hylton, The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation, No. 11-57 Boston University School of 
Law, Law and Economics Research Paper (2011). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/388 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access 
by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty 
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more 
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.  





THE ECONOMICS OF THIRD-PARTY FINANCED LITIGATION 
 
 
Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 11-57 
(December 12, 2011) 
 

















This paper can be downloaded without charge at:  
 
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2011.html   
 









The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation 
 
 








Abstract: This paper examines the law and economics of third-party financed litigation.  I 
explore the conditions under which a system of third-party financiers and litigators can 
enhance social welfare, and the conditions under which it is likely to reduce social 
welfare.   Among the applications I consider are the sale of legal rights (such as 
contingent tort claims) to insurers, to patent trolls, and to financiers generally. 
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Third-party financing of litigation is a practice in which a financier underwrites a lawsuit 
in exchange for a share of the final judgment.  It is a business that appears to be growing.  
At least two investment funds exist that are dedicated to financing high-stakes 
commercial litigation.1  There are numerous funding sources available for low-stakes 
litigation.2 
 
This is an interesting state of affairs because the legal status of third-party funded 
litigation is unclear in the U.S.  The common law prohibited third-party funding, under 
doctrines proscribing maintenance and champerty.  Maintenance refers to the financial 
participation of a third party in a lawsuit.  Champerty is the practice of funding a lawsuit 
in exchange for a share of the judgment.  At present, the common law prohibitions have 
been modified or abolished in a majority of American states.3  Still, even though the law 
on maintenance and champerty is now a patchwork quilt, there remain several American 
jurisdictions in which champertous agreements are either illegal or unenforceable.4  Only 
a handful of states have abolished the doctrines entirely.5 
 
                                                 
1 Juridica Capital Management and Burford Capital Limited are the first litigation funders to raise money 
through IPOs (on the London Stock Exchange) and aim their investments largely at the U.S. market.  
Richard Loyd, The New, New Thing, AM. LAW., May 17, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/ 
PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202457711273.  Juridica and Burford focus on large commercial matters.  Juridica 
invests exclusively in business-to-business related claims where the amount in dispute exceeds $25 million.  
Juridica Investments Limited, JURIDICA CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, http://www.juridica.co.uk/ 
investments.php (last visited June 6, 2011); Investment Objectives & Policies, BURFORD CAPITAL LIMITED, 
http://www.burfordcapital.com/objectivesandpolicies.html (last visited June 6, 2011). 
2 If one types the words “lawsuit loans” into an internet search engine, hundreds of sources for small-scale 
litigation funding will appear.  “Lawsuit Loans” Search, BING, http://www.bing.com/search?q=“lawsuit+ 
loans” (last visited June 6, 2011). 
3 As of this year, at least twenty-eight out of fifty-one American jurisdictions (including the District of 
Columbia) explicitly permit maintenance and champerty in some form.  Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic 
Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 98-99 & n.162, 107 & n.190 (2011). 
4 Sebok identifies 14 American jurisdictions that explicitly prohibit champerty (i.e. enforce champerty 
doctrine). See id. at 101-02 & n.171. 
5 Massachusetts, New Jersey, and South Carolina have abolished the doctrines entirely.  See Saladini v. 
Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1224 (Mass. 1997); Schomp v. Schenck, 40 N.J.L. 195, 203-04 (N.J. 1878); 
Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277 (S.C. 2000).  Courts in several other states have 
declared the common-law prohibitions to be nonexistent, but nevertheless have applied statutory 
restrictions on champerty.  See, e.g., Strahan v. Haynes, 262 P. 995, 997 (Ariz. 1928) (declaring doctrines 
of champerty and maintenance not to be “in force” in Arizona); cf. In re Stewart, 589 P.2d 886, 888 (Ariz. 
1979) (statute prohibits champertous agreements between attorneys and clients).  See also Abbott Ford, Inc. 
v. Superior Court, 741 P.2d 124, 141 n.26 (Cal. 1987) (“California . . . has never adopted the common law 
doctrines of champerty and maintenance . . . .”); cf. Martin v. Freeman, 31 Cal. Rptr. 217, 219 (1963) 
(statute prohibits champerty by attorneys).  See also Fasteau v. Engel, 240 P.2d 1173, 1174 (Colo. 1952) 
(doctrines “no longer exist in Colorado,” yet statutes prohibit maintenance involving barratry and officious 
intermeddling).  Finally, courts in Ohio have not yet applied what appears to be a statutory abolition of the 
doctrines. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2008); Stephen Gillers, Waiting for Good Dough: 
Litigation Funding Comes to Law, 43 AKRON L. REV. 677, 688-89 (2010). 
 2
This paper examines the economics of third-party financed litigation.6  I explore the 
conditions under which a system of third-party financiers and litigators can enhance 
social welfare, and the conditions under which it might reduce social welfare.   
 
I start with a review of the economics of litigation.  One fundamental proposition in this 
literature is that the private and social incentives to litigate diverge.7  Because of this 
incentive divergence, parties may bring suit where litigation reduces welfare, and may 
not pursue their claims even where litigation is socially desirable. However, if transaction 
costs (i.e., bargaining costs) are low, the incentive divergence problem is unlikely to 
generate welfare-reducing litigation.  The reason is that potential victims and injurers will 
enter into waiver agreements.  Another fundamental proposition, countering the incentive 
divergence proposition, is that in a low transaction cost setting, parties will sign waiver 
agreements whenever litigation reduces social welfare.8 
 
These fundamental propositions regarding the welfare effects of litigation are used to 
assess the social benefits and social costs of third-party funding and litigation.  I examine 
the implications of third-party funding in the context of “unmatured” legal claims (i.e., 
legal rights), and for matured claims.  Although markets in unmatured claims are not 
widespread at present, there are examples such as trade in intellectual property rights 
(e.g., patent trolls) and subrogation agreements by insurers. 
 
Third-party funding enhances social welfare to the extent it can resolve the incentive 
divergence problem in the presence of high transaction costs between potential injurers 
and potential victims.  There are two obvious scenarios in which this is beneficial.  One is 
where litigation would be socially desirable but victims do not sue because the cost 
exceeds the expected award.  Third-party funding permits victims to transfer their claims 
to more efficient litigators, who would then prosecute these claims.  The other scenario is 
where victims bring suit even though litigation is not socially desirable – for example, in 
a setting in which a no-fault regime would be optimal.  If transaction costs prevent waiver 
agreements from being formed between potential future litigants, the third-party funding 
mechanism (coupled with third-party control) could achieve the same outcome as 
waivers.  In addition to these benefits, third-party funding can enhance welfare by 
                                                 
6 Previous articles on the economics of third-party funding of litigation include Michael Abramowicz, On 
the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697 (2005); Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in 
Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383 (1989); Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort 
Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329 (1987); Paul H. Rubin, Third Party Financing of Litigation (Third Party 
Financing of Litigation Roundtable, Searle Ctr., Nw. Univ. Law Sch. Sept. 24-25, 2009), available at 
www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Rubin-ThirdPartyFinancingLitigation.pdf; Daniel L. Chen 
& David S. Abrams, A Market for Justice: The Effect of Litigation Funding on Legal Outcomes, available 
at http://www.duke.edu/~dlc28/papers/MktJustice.pdf.  There are many articles exploring economic aspects 
of third-party funded litigation.  The Abramowicz, Chen-Abrams, Cooter, Rubin, and Shukaitis articles are 
distinguishable because they explore the economic issues in more depth than most.  For a recent 
reexamination of Cooter’s argument, see Stephen Marks, The Market in Unmatured Tort Claims: Twenty 
Years Later (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-14, 2011). 
7 Steven Shavell, The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982). 
8 Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 209 (2000). 
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transferring viable claims to more efficient litigators, reducing the resources tied up in the 
litigation process. 
 
These benefits provide a justification for third-party funding and suggest that a total ban 
would reduce society’s welfare.  However, there are costs associated with third-party 
funding and litigation.  The nature and magnitude of the costs depend on the mechanism 
by which legal rights or claims are transferred to financiers and to litigators.  The value of 
a particular right or claim may be the private information of the victim, which could be a 
source of inefficiency in a market in which claims are transferred to third parties.  The 
victim may not know the value of his claim, or be aware of personal costs associated with 
its enforcement.  The type of litigator who will be assigned to the claim may be known by 
the third-party financier but not known by the victim, another scenario that is a plausible 
source of market failure.  If transaction costs prevent trades between third-party litigators 
and potential injurers, an expanded market in legal claims could reduce welfare by 
generating socially undesirable litigation.  External costs associated with third-party 
control of claims could outweigh the benefits from third-party enforcement.  Yet another 
potential source of inefficiency is generated by the fact that third-party enforcers gain as 
the likelihood of injury increases.  Since enforcers would have a direct interest in seeing 
more injuries, they may have incentives to reduce the rate of enforcement or to generate 
new injuries. 
 
I also examine a market in which contingent claims are auctioned to a financier who then 
assigns them to enforcers.  The bids offered by the financier reflect the type of litigator 
(enforcer) to whom the financier will assign the claim.  When the auction market is 
efficient, in the sense that it enhances society’s wealth, there are still inefficient transfers 
of legal rights that could occur.  If the auction market is inefficient – e.g., because sellers 
set the wrong prices for their rights – the problem of inefficient transfers of legal rights is 
even worse.  
 
My goal is not to say whether third-party funding of litigation is ultimately good or bad 
for social welfare; that is an empirical question.  What I have attempted to do is identify, 
within a consistent framework, the likely sources of welfare gains and losses in a third-
party litigation funding system.  Identification of the sources of gains and losses should 
have implications for empirical research and for regulation.  Empirical research on the 
welfare consequences of third-party litigation funding can be improved by taking 
advantage of developed frameworks for analyzing potential benefits and costs.  The other 
benefit from a theoretical assessment is its implications for the design of a regulatory 
system.  Since third-party funding of litigation can generate welfare gains a total ban 
would be difficult to justify.  However, since there are costs, an ideal regulatory system 
would harness the benefits of third-party funding while minimizing the costs.  The 
framework developed here could inform any such effort. 
 
Part II provides a brief background on the legal prohibitions of third-party funding and 
the theories that have supported those prohibitions.  Part III examines the economics of 
litigation, focusing on the private and social incentives to litigate and to waive the right to 
litigate.  In Part IV I extend the basic economic model of litigation to examine the 
 4
welfare consequences of third-party funded litigation.  I use the model to identify the 
sources of social benefit as well as the sources of social cost of third-party funding of 
litigation. 
 
The key analytical contribution of the model in Part IV is to move beyond the literature 
that focuses on third-party funding as a method of risk reallocation or of overcoming 
liquidity constraints.9  Although I focus on a model in which actors are risk-neutral and 
legal rights are traded for a lump-sum fee, I also show that the model includes as a special 
case the scenario in which a third-party funds litigation under a contract that involves an 
upfront payment plus a damage-sharing agreement.  Thus, although the framework below 
focuses outright purchase and sale of legal rights, its results apply with equal force to the 
standard third-party finance contract. 
 
In Part V, I extend the model again to apply it to the exchange of realized or “matured” 
claims.  In Part VI I review the implications for welfare effects of third-party funding and 
discuss regulatory issues.  
 
II. Perspectives on the Prohibitions of Third-Party Funding and Litigation 
 
Conventional third-party funding agreements would fall under the categories of 
maintenance and champerty, and any business devoted to such funding might be deemed 
guilty of barratry.  Maintenance is simply providing financial or other support to a 
lawsuit.  Champerty is a special type of maintenance in which the third party collects a 
portion of the judgment.  Barratry is the practice of stirring up litigation, and has been 
described as “a continuing practice of maintenance or champerty”.10  It follows that 
maintenance, champerty, and barratry are closely related; as if maintenance were a single 
act polluting the litigation environment, champerty pollution for profit, and barratry a 
nuisance-like process of continuing offenses. 
 
Of these practices, Blackstone had harsh words: 
 
Common barretry is the offence of frequently exciting and stirring 
up suits and quarrels . . . .  The punishment for this offence … is by fine 
and imprisonment: but if the offender . . . belongs to the profession of law, 
a barretor . . . ought also to be disabled from practicing for the future. 
Maintenance is . . . an officious intermeddling in a suit that no way 
belongs to one, by maintaining and assisting either party with money or 
otherwise . . . .  This is an offence against public justice, as it keeps alive 
strife and contention, and perverts the remedial process of the law into an 
engine of oppression. 
 Champerty . . . is a species of maintenance . . . being a bargain 
with the a plaintiff or defendant . . . to divide the land or other matter sued 
for between them . . . whereupon the champertor is to carry on the party’s 
                                                 
9 See Cooter, supra note 6; Shukaitis, supra note 6; Chen and Abrams, supra note 6; Jonathan T. Molot, A 
Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2009). 
10 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978). 
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suit at his own expense . . . .  These pests of civil society, that are 
perpetually endeavoring to disturb the repose of their neighbours, and 
officiously interfering in other men’s quarrels . . . the Roman law . . . 
punished by the forfeiture of a third part of their goods, and perpetual 
infamy.11 
 
But beyond Blackstone’s harsh words, repeated in many court opinions, it is hard to find 
a competent explanation of the reasons for prohibiting maintenance and champerty.  Max 
Radin argued that the prohibitions were enacted to put an end to the practice, adopted by 
wealthy landowners in Medieval Europe, of funding property lawsuits against their 
wealthy competitors for status brought by indigent plaintiffs.12  Through funding these 
lawsuits, in return for a share of the land, a landowner could augment his holdings and 
status.13   
 
Another explanation was offered by the plaintiff in Key v. Vattier,14 who noted that the 
rules prohibiting barratry, maintenance, and champerty were imposed after the Norman 
Conquest and the resulting redistribution of land into parcels doled out to knights loyal to 
the new government.15  Statutes became necessary later as land expropriated by force or 
assumed by the crown, due to forfeiture and escheat, was given to followers and 
favorites.  The plaintiff’s theory, which was rejected by the court, is that the ancient 
prohibitions on third-party funding resulted from the forceful taking of land and the 
consequent need to prevent dispossessed victims from seeking redress through the courts. 
 
Jeremy Bentham suggested that the prohibitions were designed to prevent bullying of 
courts by feudal barons, which implies that they may have served to reduce corruption.16  
Writing in 1787, Bentham argued that the rules were no longer necessary. 
 
The different historical theories provide contrasting pictures of the prohibitions’ 
functions: the traditional view (Radin and Bentham) suggests that they were needed at 
one time to put an end to a wasteful form of rent-seeking, while the alternative view 
(plaintiff in Key v. Vattier) suggests that they were, from the start, instruments of 
                                                 
11 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134-135. 
12 Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48, 58-66 (1935).   
13 Id.  Radin’s frequently cited critique viewed it as an effort by feudal landlords to maintain their status, 
and as part of a rearguard action against the development of capitalism. 
14 Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio 132 (1823) 
15 Id. at 136-37. 
16 The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Defense of Usury), vol. 3, Bowring ed. 1843, at 19-20.  The statutory 
prohibitions, sometimes described as declaratory of the common law, began with early laws dating from 
1275 to the early 1300s, see George Barker, Third Party Funding in Australia and Europe, conference paper 
available at http://www.masonlec.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Revised-Draft-Barker.pdf.  Barker notes 
that the most important statute (33 Ed. 1, 1305) was part of a suite of laws aimed to suppress corruption in 
government.  The statutes may have played an important role in the formative period of the common law 
system.  The relative advantage of English government in suppressing corruption of government offices 
may explain the divergence between common law and civil law systems.  See Edward L. Glaeser and 
Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Quarterly J. Econ. 1193 (2002). 
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oppression.17  That both theories are plausible indicates the difficulty of making a case 
for a total ban on third-party funding, or, on the other extreme, a laissez-faire approach 
toward the practice. 
 
The preferable alternative to both extreme positions is a fine-tuned effort to distinguish 
the types of third-party funding that are likely to be harmful and the types that are likely 
to be socially beneficial.  The common law had adopted this approach in many states,18 
and as a result the prohibitions have been narrowed over time.19  Still, the courts have not 
even attempted to identify the benefits and costs of third-party funding within a general 
assessment of the welfare consequences of litigation. 
 
It should be clear that champerty is closely related to the subject of assignment of 
potential legal claims, that is, assignment of choses in action.  The common law in many 
states permits the assignment of rights to sue for debt or for property.20  The key barrier 
to assignment is observed in the case of personal injury, where the law has traditionally 
prohibited assignment of a chose in action.21  Given this, the debate over third-party 
funding should be understood to concern personal torts largely (such as accidental injury, 
assault, battery, defamation, false imprisonment).22  Moreover, the general prohibition of 
assignment of personal torts has been narrowed, and in some cases repealed in effect, 
where states have limited or abolished the champerty rule. 
 
III. Economics of Litigation and Waiver 
 
I will provide a simple formal analysis of the economics of third-party litigation finance.  
The third-party finance system that I will examine initially is one involving the purchase 
of unmatured claims – that is, claims that have not materialized.  Thus, a potential victim 
                                                 
17 One period in modern American history in which the prohibitions were enforced with an oppressive 
purpose is that of the civil rights litigation in the 1950s.  Several southern states amended their barratry 
laws in order to obstruct civil rights plaintiffs, see Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-
Party Litigation Funding, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1268, 1287 (2011). 
18 See Osprey, 532 S.E.2d at 274-77. 
19 See id. (describing development of law in South Carolina).  See also Paul Bond, Making Champerty 
Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1297, 1302-04 (2002).  One question that has 
received little attention in the common law development is the difference between criminal penalties and 
unenforceability rules.  Both rules have applied to varying degrees to champerty.  However, one 
liberalizing approach, observed in recent English law, is to abolish the criminal penalties but leave 
champertous contracts unenforceable.  See Andrea Pinna, Financing Civil Litigation: The Case for the 
Assignment and Securitization of Liability Claims, in NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
EUROPE 109, 113-14 (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2010). 
20 See, e.g., Bond, supra note 19, at 1299. 
21 Id. 
22 Indeed, the controversy over third-party funding of litigation focuses on a novel source of incremental 
funding that may be relatively unimportant in terms of the overall market for litigation finance.  Lawsuits 
are already funded by lawyers who accept contingent fees, though one could view this as form of self-
financing by plaintiffs.  There is already a large industry in lending directly to personal injury plaintiffs and 
to law firms.  See Steven Garber, RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Alternative Litigation Funding in the 
United States (2010), 9-13 available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP306.pdf (describing 
markets in lending to plaintiffs and to law firms). 
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would assign all or a subset of his potential tort claims to a third party.  The specific 
arrangement I will consider is one in which claims are sold to a financier, who then 
assigns or sells the claims to litigators (or enforcers).  The sale of an unmatured claim can 
be considered equivalent to the sale of a legal right. 
 
However, before I discuss third-party finance of litigation, I will begin with an 
examination of the economics of litigation and of waiver agreements.  The basic results 
on litigation and waiver will be used later in the paper to shed light on the economics of 
third-party funded litigation. 
 
I start with a simple model of litigation, from Shavell.23  There are two types of agents: 
potential victims and potential injurers.  For simplicity, I will often refer to the potential 
victim as “the victim,” and the potential injurer as “the injurer”.  I will also use the term 
“plaintiff” to refer to the victim at times, and the term “defendant” to refer to the injurer. 
 
An injurer can take care, which is costly, and thereby reduce the likelihood of injuring a 
victim.  If the victim is injured he will bring a lawsuit, provided that his expected 
recovery exceeds the cost of brining suit.  The basic variables in this analysis are as 
follows: 
 
 p = probability of injury if the injurer does not take care. 
 
q = probability of injury if the injurer takes care, 0 < q < p. 
 
v = loss suffered by the victim if an accident occurs. 
 
x = the cost of care for the injurer. 
 
cp = cost of litigation for the victim (plaintiff). 
 
cd = cost of litigation for the injurer (defendant). 
 
In addition to these definitions, I assume that society’s costs when injurers fail to take 
care are greater than society’s costs when injurers take care. 
 
               pv > qv + x.              (1) 
 
Thus, taking care is socially desirable.  It follows that injurers will take care whenever 
suit is permitted because pv + pcd > qv + x + qcd.  To simplify matters, I will assume that 
liability is strict and v > cp, so that the victim will always sue when injured.  If I assumed 
that the rule of negligence applied, all of the results of this model would remain with only 
minor modifications in the arguments. 
 
The assumption that taking care is socially desirable is equivalent to assuming that 
enforcement of the law is socially desirable.  Although I adopt this as a basic premise to 
                                                 
23 Shavell, supra note 7 at 334-35. 
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simplify the model’s presentation, my analysis of the economics of litigation does not 
require this assumption. 
 
I will treat all of the parties as risk neutral.  This is a simplifying assumption.  In many 
real-world settings the victim and the injurer will be risk averse.24  I set the issue of risk 
aversion aside because I want to focus on the incentive consequences of litigation. 
 
A. Private Versus Social Incentive to Litigate 
 
Within this framework, Shavell establishes the following result. 
 
Incentive Divergence Theorem: Litigation is socially desirable when the deterrence 
benefit from litigation exceeds the expected cost of litigation.  A lawsuit is privately 
desirable from the plaintiff’s perspective when the expected award exceeds the expected 
cost of litigation to the plaintiff.  Thus, the private incentive to litigate diverges from the 
social incentive. 
 
The proof of this claim follows from comparing society’s costs when litigation is 
prohibited to its costs when litigation is permitted.  When litigation is prohibited, injurers 
do not take care and the total cost borne by society, on a per capita basis, is pv.  When 
suit is permitted, injurers take care, and society’s costs are qv+ qcd + qcp + x.  Thus, suit 
is socially desirable if and only if qv + qcd + qcp + x < pv or alternatively 
 
(p – q)v – x > q(cp + cd)              (2) 
 
The left-hand side of this inequality is the social benefit from deterrence.  It is equal to 
the injuries avoided by taking care, less the cost of taking care.  The right hand side of the 
inequality is the expected cost of litigation.  Thus, if the deterrence benefit exceeds the 
expected litigation cost, suit is desirable from society’s perspective.  The final step in the 
argument is to note that the private incentive to litigate is simply v > cp, which implies 
that a plaintiff may have an incentive to file a suit that is not within society’s interests.  If 
the inequality in (2) is reversed, so that the deterrence benefit is less than the total cost of 
litigation, social welfare could be enhanced by prohibiting litigation – even where a 
plaintiff wishes to sue. 
 
When a plaintiff decides to sue, he thinks only about his own judgment and his own cost 
of litigating.  But the social interest is different, because it depends on whether the 
deterrence benefit from litigation, which is the difference between the losses avoided by 
taking care and the cost of taking care, is greater than the expected costs of litigation. 
 
In this framework, conditions are uniform among agents.  If litigation is socially 
desirable, then every lawsuit enhances society’s wealth, and if litigation is not socially 
desirable, then every lawsuit reduces society’s wealth.  The uniformity assumption makes 
the analysis simple, but it is not a realistic description of litigation.  
                                                 
24 On liability and risk aversion, see Jennifer H. Arlen, Liability for Physical Injury When Injurers as Well 
as Victims Suffer Losses, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 411, 412-15, 422-23 (1992). 
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If we introduce heterogeneity (for example, in the size of the victim’s loss or in the cost 
of taking care) to this framework, we observe diminishing returns to litigation.  The first 
lawsuit may be worthwhile in terms of the deterrence benefits it brings to society, but the 
one hundredth lawsuit may be undesirable.  Because of diminishing deterrence returns, 
there is likely to be an optimal number of lawsuits.  Moreover, if the total cost of 
litigation rises as more lawsuits are filed, say because of court congestion, then there may 
be an optimal number of lawsuits even if the uniformity assumptions regarding care and 
accident injuries are maintained.  The result is depicted in Figure 1, which shows that 
there is a frequency of litigation (e.g., number of lawsuits per year) where the marginal 
social benefit from litigation (based on deterrence benefits) is just equal to its marginal 





   Figure 1: Optimal frequency of lawsuits 
 
 
Any proponent of an expansion in litigation should consider whether the rate of litigation 
is below or above N*, the optimal frequency of lawsuits.  The prospect that an expansion 
of third-party funded litigation could bring forth more lawsuits does not tell us whether 
social welfare would be enhanced by such a change.  Indeed, Rubin has argued that the 
litigation in America is probably beyond the optimal frequency, given the widespread 
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acceptance of contingency fee arrangements and of class action lawsuits.25  This is an 
empirical question that I will not attempt to answer here.  My focus is on identifying the 
reasons third-party finance may or may not enhance social welfare. 
 
B. Low Transaction Costs 
 
The Incentive Divergence Theorem discussed in Part A does not take into account the 
possibility of litigation waivers.  A litigation waiver is an agreement between a potential 
victim and a potential injurer in which the victim agrees not to bring suit if he is injured 
by the injurer.  If transaction costs (i.e., the costs of bargaining over and reaching an 
agreement) are low, potential victims and potential injurers may be able to enter into 
waiver agreements. 
 
The failure of the Incentive Divergence Theorem to take such waivers into account may 
be defensible under certain conditions.  There are settings in which potential victims and 
potential injurers cannot identify each other ex ante – i.e., before the accident.  In those 
settings it would be impossible for litigation waiver agreements to be exchanged ex ante; 
transaction costs are too high.  However, there are also settings where potential litigants 
have opportunities to exchange litigation waivers; consider, for example, places where 
buyers and sellers of services constantly interact, such as the workplace.  In such low 
transaction cost settings, litigation waivers may be observed.  Alternatively, consider a 
firm’s decision to sell a patent to its potential infringer, or to someone who is unlikely to 
enforce the patent; such a sale would be equivalent to waiving the right to sue for patent 
infringement. 
 
If transaction costs are sufficiently low that litigation waivers are easy to exchange, the 
Incentive Divergence Theorem will no longer hold.  The reason is that litigation waivers 
will be traded whenever the social benefit from a lawsuit is less than its social cost.  
 
To see this, return to the model described earlier.  Suppose the victim can sell his right to 
sue to the injurer.  What price will he set on that right? 
 
If he sells the right to the injurer, the injurer will no longer take care.  Thus, the victim 
can expect to suffer the harm pv after selling the right.  However, selling the right permits 
him to forgo the expense of suing, which is worth qcp.  He also forgoes the compensation 
he would receive for any injuries that occurred when he possessed the right to sue, but 
that compensation merely offsets the injuries suffered by accidents.  This implies that the 
minimum price asked by the victim to waive his right to sue is 
 
       pv – qcp.              (3) 
                                                 
25 Rubin, supra note 6, at 8-9.  One important factor weighing in favor of Rubin’s argument is that class 
actions and third-party enforcement cases will often involve claims that would be unprofitable for the 
victim to assert.  In the American litigation environment, those claims are brought forward today under the 
class action device.  Introducing third-party funding and enforcement would not be necessary to bring such 
claims into court.  Indeed, lawyers might prefer to use the class action device rather than purchase claims in 
order to enforce vicariously. 
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What is the maximum offer price that the injurer will pay for the waiver?  By purchasing 
the waiver, the injurer avoids the cost of taking care, in addition to the cost of litigation 
and compensation.  It follows that the maximum price the injurer will offer for a litigation 
waiver is 
 
x + qv + qcd .             (4) 
 
The injurer and victim will therefore sign a litigation waiver agreement when and only 
when pv – qcp < x + qv + qcd, which is equivalent to (p – q)v – x < qcd + qcp, the same 
condition under which litigation is socially undesirable (2).26  The efficiency gain from 
waiving litigation is q(cd + cp) + x – (p – q)v  > 0.  This proves the following 
proposition:27 
 
Litigation Waiver Theorem: Litigation waivers will be exchanged when and only when 
the deterrence benefit from litigation is less than the expected total cost of litigation.  
Thus, if transaction costs are low, socially undesirable litigation will not be observed.  
 
The Litigation Waiver Theorem has implications for arbitration agreements as well as 
waiver agreements.  In some circumstances an arbitration agreement may serve the same 
purpose, or have the same effect, as a waiver agreement.  Suppose, for example, that the 
victim agrees to resolve all disputes with the injurer in an arbitration forum that is 
obviously biased in favor of the injurer.  In this case the arbitration agreement operates in 
effect as a waiver.  Waiver and arbitration agreements can enhance society’s wealth by 
reducing the frequency of wealth-reducing litigation.  Moreover, the Litigation Waiver 
Theorem implies that such agreements are likely to be observed in those settings in which 
litigation reduces society’s welfare.28 
 
There are issues of information and disclosure that could stand in the way of the 
efficiency implications of the Litigation Waiver Theorem.  For example, a potential 
                                                 
26 Recall that I have assumed that a strict liability rule applies, in order to simplify the analysis.  If the 
negligence rule applies, the analysis changes a bit, but the conclusion remains the same.  Under negligence, 
if the potential victim agrees to a waiver, he knows that the potential injurer will not take care, so the 
expected cost to the potential victim is pv.  If the victim did not agree to a waiver, then his expected cost is 
equal to qv + qcp – this reflects the assumption that the victim would sue the injurer and lose, because the 
injurer, having taken care, would not be found negligent.  Under these assumptions, the injurer would be 
willing to pay a maximum of x + qcd for a waiver.  Waivers will therefore be exchanged when the potential 
legal claim is inefficient.  If I assume, instead, that the victim observes the injurer’s care level, and decides 
not to sue under negligence, then there would be no litigation costs to consider in this analysis. 
27 Hylton, supra note 8, at 221. 
28 I have not considered the case of dormant legal rights – that is, the case where v < cp.  When litigation 
would be unprofitable, the victim will not sue.  Given this, the injurer would not have an incentive to take 
care.  In the zero transaction cost setting, the victim would be willing to pay (p – q)v for the injurer to take 
care.  The injurer loses only x by taking care.  Thus, whenever (p – q)v > x, a contract will be arranged in 
which the potential victim purchases care from the potential injurer.  Indeed, if transaction costs are zero, 
the victim and injurer will contract for optimal care and litigation will not be necessary in any event.  I am 
assuming in this framework that transaction costs can be sufficiently low for a waiver agreement to be 
formed, and at the same time too high for the parties to contract directly over the level of care. 
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victim might sign a waiver agreement without realizing its scope.  Alternatively, a 
potential victim might sign an arbitration agreement without realizing that it is effectively 
a waiver agreement.  These features could lead to inefficient waivers.  However, these are 
general issues of contract acceptance.  They do not, without more, present a justification 
for a ban on waiver or arbitration agreements.  However, they do justify an effort on the 





The framework described so far can be summarized with an example that illustrates its 
applicability as well as some of its limits.  Suppose a ski resort has a choice whether to 
adopt additional precautions to reduce the risk of injury to skiers, or to offer them an 
option to waive tort liability in exchange for a reduction in the price of a season ticket.  
The precautions will cost the resort $40 per skier in a season.29  If the ski resort takes no 
steps to enhance safety, the likelihood of an injury during the season to the typical skier is 
¾.  If the resort adopts precautions, the likelihood of an injury is ¼.  The expected harm 
from an injury is $100.  Suppose, in addition, that the cost of litigation (taking settlement 
rates into account) is $60 for the skier (victim) and for the ski resort (injurer).  If a skier is 
injured, he would have an incentive to sue the resort, because he would net $40 from the 
lawsuit.  What is the minimum amount by which the season ticket would have to be 
discounted to get the skier to accept a tort litigation waiver?  How much would the ski 
resort be willing to discount the season ticket price in exchange for a waiver? 
 
Litigation would be inefficient in this example, because the deterrence benefit is less than 
the expected total cost of litigation.  On the other hand, the threat of litigation would, in 
the absence of any waivers, induce the ski resort to pay for additional precautions. 
 
The skier would be willing to waive his potential tort claims against the resort if the 
resort discounted the entrance price by (¾)($100) – (¼)($60) = $60.  The resort would be 
willing to discount the season ticket price by the amount it saves from avoiding tort suits, 
which includes the savings from not paying for additional precautions.  The maximum 
amount that the resort would be willing to discount the ticket price by is equal to the sum 
of the per-skier season precaution cost ($40) and the cost of a tort suit ((¼)($100 + $60)); 
thus, the maximum discount is $80.  Since the resort gains $80 from the waiver, and the 
skier loses $60 from the waiver, there is room for a welfare-enhancing litigation waiver 
provision in the season ticket contract.  In view of the savings from the inclusion of a 
waiver provision, competition would cause ski resorts to include such a provision as the 
default. 
 
Because the cost of transacting is low in this example, the waiver agreement enables the 
parties to avoid inefficient litigation.  However, some cases will raise questions whether 
the injury is the type that should be understood to have been covered by the waiver 
                                                 
29 To avoid issues generated by the public-good nature of care, I will assume in this example that the 
precautions can be limited to an individual skier.  If precaution is a public good, in the sense that providing 
it for one means that it is effectively provided for all, then it is possible to have socially inefficient waivers. 
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clause.  Some injured skiers will argue that they never understood or even noticed the 
waiver clause.  In light of these issues, some courts may refuse to enforce the waiver 
agreement.30 
 
IV. Third-Party Finance of Litigation 
 
The type of third-party finance I will examine initially is the purchase of unmatured legal 
claims.  An example would be a third party who purchases a potential victim’s right to 
sue before any claim arises.  Under such an agreement, the third party would have the 
right to sue on behalf of the real victim and collect all or some share of the damages 
awarded to the victim.  The third party would also have the right to waive the victim’s 
future legal claims.31 
 
To offer a concrete example, suppose the third party enforcer is an insurance company, as 
Cooter proposes.32  Under a system in which unmatured claims are transferable, the 
insurance company could purchase the potential claims and then prosecute them when an 
injury occurs (as insurance companies do already in subrogation actions), or waive them 
immediately in exchange for a payment from the potential injurer (or the potential 
injurer’s liability insurer).  In a setting in which lawsuits are extremely costly and have a 
negligible deterrence effect, numerous waivers would be observed. 
 
Since the third-party enforcer will acquire the contingent legal claim of a victim, the 
contract between the victim and the third party will typically specify some combination 
of upfront payment for the legal claim and perhaps some portion of the damage award 
that will be shared between the enforcer and victim.  The upfront payment need not be 
positive; the contract could involve the victim paying the enforcer to take control of his 
future claims.  The size of the upfront payment will depend on the litigation expenses that 
will be borne by the enforcer and the share of damages passed on to the victim. 
 
There are four parties in this analysis: the potential victim, the potential injurer, the claim 
purchaser (or financier), and the claim litigator or enforcer.  I have separated the financier 
from the enforcer to isolate their potentially different functions in a third-party finance 
scheme.  However, for the most part I will treat the third-party financier and enforcer as a 
single entity; references to one can be taken generally as references to the other.  Where it 
is important to separate their different functions I will do so. 
 
The first step in analyzing third-party litigation finance is to use the analysis of waiver 
agreements to discover its implications for third-party agreements.  At first, the two types 
of agreement may seem to be entirely different.  A waiver involves discarding legal 
claims in exchange for compensation from the potential defendant.  Third-party financing 
                                                 
30 See, e.g., Dalury v. S-K-I Ltd., 670 A.2d 795 (Vt. 1995). 
31 One could imagine an alternative system in which third parties gain ownership of potential claims, but 
without control.  In such a system, third-party funding would be just a system of risk reallocation.  A 
securitization market in which financiers were unable to exercise control over the allocation of rights of 
action would serve this function.  The benefits of risk reallocation as a justification for third-party funding 
have been thoroughly explored in the literature, though without formalization. 
32 Cooter, supra note 6, at 385. 
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of litigation, in the context of unmatured claims, involves selling legal claims to be 
enforced at the discretion of a third party. 
 
A closer look, however, reveals the similarity between waiver and third-party funded 
litigation.  A waiver involves a sale of a legal right to the potential injurer.  A third-party 
finance agreement covering an unmatured claim involves the sale of a legal right to a 
third party.  The third-party purchaser could be the alter ego of the potential injurer, in 
which case a litigation finance agreement operates effectively as a waiver.  Alternatively, 
the third-party purchaser could act with the same interest and zeal as the victim himself.  
These two cases – sale to the alter ego of the injurer and sale to the alter ego of the victim 
– represent two endpoints on the spectrum of outcomes that could be observed in a third-
party litigation finance system. 
 
A. Asking Prices for Legal Rights 
 
Consider the incentives of a potential victim to sell his unmatured claim to a third party.  
If the potential victim sells to the alter ego of the potential injurer, the victim will demand 
the same price that he would ask of the injurer, that is, pv – qcp.  The reason is that the 
victim knows that if he sells his claim to the alter ego of the potential injurer, the injurer 
will no longer take care, so the victim will suffer the same costs as if he had relinquished 
his potential legal claims to the injurer. 
 
If the potential victim sells his claims to someone who enforces with the same zeal as the 
victim would – that is, to the victim’s own alter ego – the result would be that the 
potential injurer would take care, and there would be no increase in the risk of harm to 
the victim.  The key gain to the victim would be avoiding future litigation costs – because 
those costs would be borne by his alter ego enforcer.  Given this, there is room for the 
alter ego to profit from such an exchange if the alter ego’s litigation expenses are lower 
than the victim’s. 
 
This description of the victim’s price-setting incentive is arguably incomplete because it 
does not take into account the damage-sharing arrangement that might be demanded by 
the third-party financier.  The third-party financier may offer a contract in which he takes 
part of the damage award in exchange for a smaller upfront transfer.33  However, I will 
                                                 
33 One important feature of this arrangement is that the risk preferences of the victim and of the financier 
will determine the optimal levels of the upfront payment and the division of the damage award.  If the 
victim is the more risk-averse party, the contract will generate a relatively larger upfront payment and 
relatively small amount of damages.  Although my focus in the text is on the incentive effects of third-party 
funding, it is important to note that the financing arrangement alone can provide efficiency gains to society.  
Traditional litigation markets involve standardized award-splitting arrangements under contingency fee 
contracts.  The third-party financing system permits the financier to structure a contract that allocates risk 
optimally as between the parties.  Shukaitis, supra note 6, at 339-41, notes that risk can be allocated in a 
superior manner through the sale of tort claims.  See also Cooter, supra note 6, at 385, 387.  Since most 
victims are likely to be risk-averse in comparison to the financier, most contracts should specify a relatively 
large upfront payment and a correspondingly small amount of damages shared.  For a proposal for third-
party financing limited to the sharing of the risk associated with matured legal claims, see Richard W. 
Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 625 (1995).  
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assume that the contracts involve only an upfront payment for the victim’s legal right, 
with the financier taking the entire damage payment.   
 
The model could be made more complicated by allowing for a damage-sharing 
arrangement, which I do in the Appendix, but the additional complications do not change 
the fundamental results of this model.  Incentives to trade legal rights, in this model, are 
unaffected by the financing arrangement – i.e., whether it is an upfront payment or the 
combination of an upfront payment plus damage sharing.  For this reason it is appropriate 
in this model to treat the third-party finance contract (which typically involves a 
combination of an upfront payment plus damage sharing) as a special case of a contract 
that trades a legal right. 
 
The most obvious real-world example of an alter ego enforcer is the insurance company.  
If we view the insurance company as the victim’s alter ego in litigation, then one can 
understand why potential victims would purchase insurance even if they are not risk-
averse.  Consider, for example, a health insurance firm.  When the victim is injured, the 
insurance firm pays off the victim’s medical expenses, and then brings a subrogation 
action against the injurer.  In the subrogation action, the health insurance firm serves as 
the third-party enforcer for the victim.34  The insurance firm combines the services of 
insurance and litigation.  Another real-world alter ego enforcer is the patent troll.  Patent 
owners transfer their rights to trolls because trolls are more efficient enforcers. 
 
These two extreme cases (injurer alter ego and victim alter ego) suggest there is a way to 
formally analyze the incentives to sell to a third party.  Assume the victim can sell his 
legal claim to either the alter ego of the injurer or to his own alter ego.  Let δ represent 
the probability that the victim sells to the alter ego of the injurer, and 1 – δ the probability 
that the victim sells to his own alter ego. 
 
With these terms in mind, the price a victim would demand in order to sell his legal right 
(or claim) to a third party is 
 
          Asking price = δpv + (1 – δ)qv – qcp                           (5) 
 
Consider first the case where the legal right is offered to the alter ego of the injurer.  In 
the injurer-alter-ego case (δ = 1), the asking price is 
                                                 
34 The analogy is not perfect.  The insurer can sue only for the medical expenses it has incurred, not for the 
total injury to the victim, which may be greater than the medical expenses.  Substantial efficiency gains in 
litigation, as well as enhancements in deterrence, could be secured through permitting medical insurers to 
contract with their customers to bring subrogation actions for the entire damage award.  See Kenneth S. 
Reinker and David Rosenberg, Unlimited Subrogation: Improving Medical Malpractice Liability by 
Allowing Insurers to Take Charge, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (2007).  Another difference between the 
“unlimited subrogation” system of Reinker and Rosenberg and a system of complete third-party control is 
that in the latter system a third-party who owns a set of claims could choose to waive them.  Thus, a 
medical insurer could act as an intermediary that provides insurance to the customer and, if conditions 
indicate, waives their potential legal claims.  The medical insurer could offer customers a choice to either 
have their claims litigated in a future subrogation action, or waived upfront.  If waiver is the efficient 
option, the medical insurer would offer the lowest price for insurance to customers who choose to waive 
their potential tort claims. 
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           pv – qcp               (6) 
 
If the asking price is positive the victim will demand a payment from the injurer-alter-ego 
enforcer in order to sell off his potential claim.  In the case of a negative asking price, the 
victim will be willing to pay the financier to take control of his future legal claim. 
 
Now consider the other extreme, where the third-party financier-enforcer is the alter ego 
of the victim.  In the victim-alter-ego case (δ = 0), the asking price is 
 
     qv – qcp                            (7) 
 
The alter ego of the victim threatens the injurer with a lawsuit if the injurer causes an 
injury to the victim.  Given this, the injurer takes care and the frequency of injury is 
consistent with caretaking rather than carelessness. 
 
B. Offer Prices for Legal Rights: Incentives of Third-Party Financier-Litigators 
 
How much will a third-party enforcer pay for a legal claim?  As the foregoing discussion 
indicates, the offer price of the enforcer will depend on his incentives – specifically, 
whether the enforcer will act with the same zeal as the victim (sue for damages) or pursue 
the same goals as the injurer (drop the claim).  If the third-party enforcer behaves in the 
victim’s interest, the price he will offer for the victim’s claim will depend largely on the 
degree to which he is a more efficient enforcer than is the victim.  Since the victim gains 
in this case by unloading enforcement costs onto the third-party enforcer, the enforcer 
gains only if he is a more efficient enforcer. 
 
The opposite extreme to consider is where the third-party enforcer pursues the same goals 
as the injurer.  In this case, the third-party enforcer may be willing to pay a premium that 
reflects the precaution and litigation cost savings that will accrue to the injurer.  
However, this is a more complicated case to consider than the opposite extreme where 
the third-party enforcer is the alter ego of the victim. 
 
I will start with the simpler case, where the enforcer is the alter ego of the victim and the 
victim knows this.  Let ce be the litigation cost of the third-party enforcer.  The enforcer’s 
offer price will be less than or equal to the profit the enforcer earns from holding the 
claim; thus, the offer price when the enforcer is the alter ego of the victim is  
 
         qv – qce . 
 
Now consider the third-party enforcer who is the alter ego of the injurer.  The third-party 
enforcer’s acquisition of the legal right means that the claim will be dropped and the 
injurer will not have an incentive to take care.  Since the third-party enforcer is the alter 
ego of the injurer, he benefits as much as the injurer by not having to pay damages.  
Thus, the offer price set by the alter ego of the injurer is  
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     x + qv + qcd . 
 
C. A Spot Market in Legal Rights: Low Transaction Cost Case 
 
To examine the properties of a market in contingent legal claims where third parties fund 
litigation by purchasing rights, I will start with the simplest type of market to examine, 
one in which victims know precisely the type of enforcer to whom they are selling their 
claim.  Another way of putting this is to say that there are no transaction costs in the 
market for exchange of legal rights. 
 
In terms of the model, the low transaction cost assumption implies that each victim 
knows whether the probability that he is facing an injurer-alter-ego is equal to zero or 
equal to one.  In examining the sale of legal claims, I will continue to treat victims as 
homogeneous and to assume that the potential injuries they might suffer, as well as the 
relevant probabilities of the injury occurring, are observable by the enforcer. 
 
1. Selling Legal Rights to Third Parties 
 
First, consider the sale of a legal right to the alter ego of the victim. Since the victim is 
assumed to know that δ = 0, and the profit earned by the third-party enforcer is qv – qce, 
an arrangement in which the third-party enforcer purchases the victim’s unmatured claim 
will occur when 
 
     qv – qcp  <  qv – qce , 
 
or, equivalently, when ce < cp.  Thus, when the third-party acts as the alter ego of the 
victim, victims will sell their legal claims to the third parties when and only when the 
third parties are more efficient litigators than is the victim.  Such transfers will enhance 
social welfare by permitting legal rights to be enforced more cheaply. 
 
Third-party enforcers could be more efficient litigators for several reasons.  First, they 
may have superior skill in detecting legal violations and in gathering evidence of 
violations.  Second, they may be superior monitors and managers of attorneys, because 
they are repeat players in litigation.  Third, third-party enforcement may offer superior 
alignment of interests between litigators and victims (i.e., lower agency costs).  As owner 
of the victim’s claim, the third-party enforcer has optimal incentives to invest in 
litigation.  Risk aversion and liquidity constraints, two problems that constrain ordinary 
plaintiffs from pursuing claims, can be eliminated as factors by transferring ownership of 
potential claims. 
 
The insurance company, as a third-party enforcer, employs the skills that it develops in 
the course of identifying and evaluating compensable claims in determining the cause and 
the severity of injury for litigation purposes.35  The insurance company, as a repeat player 
                                                 
35 For example, a medical insurer is likely to be far better at detecting and procuring evidence of medical 
malpractice than is the typical plaintiff’s attorney, see Reinker & Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 272.  The 
medical insurer will also have an advantage in assessing the severity of loss in connection to malpractice.  
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in litigation, is also likely to be a better monitor and manager of plaintiffs’ attorneys than 
the typical accident victim.36  The patent troll has an advantage over the typical patent 
holder in monitoring for instances of possible infringement, responding with credible 
threats of litigation,37 and managing attorneys.  These advantages make it possible for a 
substantial market to exist in which victim-alter-egos acquire and enforce legal rights. 
 
Next, consider the sale of legal rights to the alter ego of the injurer, where the victim 
knows that this is the case (δ = 1).  The third-party enforcer’s acquisition of the legal 
right means that the claim will be dropped, and the injurer will not have an incentive to 
take care.  Since the third-party enforcer is the alter ego of the injurer, he benefits as 
much as the injurer by not having to pay damages.  The victim will sell to the third-party 
enforcer when 
 
              pv – qcp  < x + qv + qcd 
 
which is the condition under which the Litigation Waiver Theorem holds.  Thus, when the 
third party acts as the alter ego of the injurer, the victim will sell his potential claim to 
the third party when and only when litigation would be socially undesirable. 
 
Suppose the victim-alter-ego and the injurer-alter-ego both are in the market for legal 
rights at the same time.  If the victim-alter-ego purchases the victim’s claim, would he 
then turn around and sell it to the injurer-alter-ego?  Only if the claim is inefficient, in the 
sense that the deterrence benefit from enforcement is less than total litigation cost.  To 
see this, note that if the victim-alter-ego were to sell to the injurer-alter-ego, he would 
have to set the price at a level that reflects the fact that the injurer would not take care 
after the claim was transferred to the injurer-alter-ego.  This implies that the victim-alter-
ego would set an asking price of pv – qce.  Now, a mutually beneficial exchange between 
the victim-alter-ego and the injurer-alter-ego occurs only if 
    
        pv – qce  < x + qv + qcd . 
 
Thus, the victim-alter-ego enforcer would sell his potential claim to the injurer-alter-ego 
enforcer only if enforcement (litigation) would be inefficient. 
 
Given both the victim-alter-ego and the injurer-alter-ego are in the market for legal 
claims, who would bid the highest?  The assumption here is that the victim knows the 
type of enforcer who seeks to purchase his claim.  Thus, the victim will set one price for 
the victim-alter-ego and another price for the injurer-alter-ego.  Given that the victim sets 
different prices, he will be tempted to sell to the enforcer who offers the greatest surplus 
over his minimum asking price.  The surplus offered by the victim-alter-ego enforcer is 
                                                 
36 Reinker & Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 273-274. 
37 The supply of a credible threat of litigation is probably the most important function of the patent troll, 
see, e.g., James F. McDonough, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of 
Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 Emory L. J. 189 (2006).  In the absence of a credible threat of 
litigation, no one has an incentive to respect a patent.  Patent holders – especially individual inventors – are 
unlikely to present credible threats to potential infringers. 
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the potential litigation-cost efficiency gain, q(cp – ce).  The surplus offered by the injurer-
alter-ego enforcement is equal to the efficiency gain from waiving litigation, q(cd +cp) + 
x – (p – q)v.  It follows that the injurer-alter-ego will outbid the victim-alter-ego for 
ownership of the victim’s legal right if (and only if) the efficiency gain from waiving 
litigation exceeds the efficiency gain from cheaper litigation.  In terms of the model, this 
means that 
  
          q(cp – ce)  <  q(cd +cp) + x – (p – q)v . 
 
These results have immediate implications for dormant legal rights – that is, rights that 
are unlikely to be enforced.  In the model examined in the previous parts I assumed 
victims would assert their legal claims, but this assumption may not be true.  Some legal 
rights are dormant because the cost of litigation for the right exceeds the likely value of 
the judgment (v < cp).
38  In the full information market examined here, those rights may 
be traded to third-party enforcers, who are more efficient litigators.  When enforcement is 
inefficient, the third-party enforcers will sell their claims to potential injurers.39 
 
The conditions under which dormant legal rights will be traded and enforced are as 
follows: 
 
 ce <  v < cp    
 
    (p – q)v – x > q(cd + ce)  
 
These conditions imply that the claim is unprofitable to the victim, but profitable to the 
third-party enforcer.  In addition, suit by the third-party enforcer would be efficient. 
  
This discussion implies that in the one-on-one spot market in which legal rights are sold 
to third-party enforcers, such rights will be sold either to real enforcers (alter egos of 
victims) or to the alter egos of the injurers.  If enforcement of rights is socially desirable, 
the victim-alter-ego enforcers (e.g., insurance company, patent troll) will be the highest 
bidders.  If enforcement of rights is inefficient, the injurer-alter-egos will be the highest 
bidders, as long as the efficiency gain from waiving is greater than that from cheaper 
litigation.  When injurer-alter-ego enforcers acquire victim rights, they will extinguish 
them. 
 
I have assumed that victims are all the same in this discussion.  If victims differ, so that 
litigation would be efficient for some of them but inefficient for others, the implications 
of this analysis remain intact.  Suppose, for example, half of the potential victims will 
suffer such small injuries that litigation would be inefficient.  Victims in the other half 
                                                 
38 Suit may be unprofitable to the victim for several reasons.  First, the monetary expenses of litigation may 
exceed the award.  Second, the award may be so far delayed that the victim is led to discount the value of 
the award to a small amount.  This is equivalent to increasing the cost of prosecuting a claim.  Third, the 
victim may be risk averse, which effectively increases the cost of litigation.  Shukaitis, supra note 6, relies 
on these factors to support his argument in favor of selling rights of action to third parties. 
39 On the divergence of private and social incentives to litigate, see Shavell, supra note 7. 
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suffer large injuries, so that litigation would be efficient.  In the efficient spot market 
examined here, the low-injury victims would sell their claims to injurer-alter-ego 
enforcers and the high-injury victims would sell their claims to victim-alter-ego 
enforcers. 
 
2. Examples  
 
Medical Insurer Example: Return to the ski resort hypothetical (Part III.C).  The skier has 
a medical insurer that charges an actuarially fair price for insurance.  If the insurer’s 
administrative cost amounts to $1 per ski season, the actuarially fair price for a season of 
insurance is $26, assuming all of the potential injury losses are medical expenses.  
Suppose the cost of litigation for the insurer is $20, only a third of the cost of litigation 
for the skier ($60).  How much will the medical insurer discount the price of insurance if 
it subrogates the skier’s potential tort claim?  How much will the medical insurer 
discount the price of insurance if it sells the potential claim to the ski resort? 
 
By subrogating the skier’s potential tort claim, the medical insurer gets a benefit of 
(¼)($100 – $20) = $20.  Thus, the medical insurer, if it chooses to subrogate, should be 
willing to discount the price of a season of insurance by as much as $20.  A competitive 
market for medical insurance should drive the per-season price down to $6. 
 
However, litigation is still inefficient in this scenario.  The deterrence benefit from 
litigation is (¾ – ¼)($100) – $40 = $10.  The expected total cost of litigation, under the 
subrogation agreement, is (¼)($60 + $20) = $20.  Since the expected total cost exceeds 
the deterrence benefit, welfare can be enhanced by selling the skier’s potential tort claim 
to the resort. 
 
The resort is willing to purchase the skier’s potential tort claim for $80.  The medical 
insurer would sell the skier’s potential claim for $20.  If the medical insurer sells the tort 
claim to the resort for more than $50 it would be able to offer free medical insurance to 
the skier and still make a profit.  Moreover, questions concerning the scope of the waiver 
are more likely to be addressed at the contracting stage in this scenario than in the case 
where the skier enters into a waiver agreement directly with the ski resort. 
 
Patent Troll Example:  Suppose an inventor has a patent on an invention that potentially 
guarantees an income of $100 through use or licensing.  A corporation happens to be 
developing a functionally equivalent invention.  The corporation has a choice whether to 
invest $40 in searching prior patents to ensure that it does not infringe the inventor’s 
patent.  If the corporation does not search, the probability it will infringe the patent is ¾.  
If the corporation searches, the probability of infringement is ¼.  Suppose the cost of 
litigation for both the inventor and the corporation is $120 each. 
 
Although the inventor has a patent, he will not sue to enforce because the damage award 
is at most $100 and the cost of litigation is $120.  This is a plausible and probably 
common scenario because part of the cost of litigation for the inventor is the opportunity 
cost of his time, which could be devoted to working in his laboratory rather than pursuing 
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infringers in court.  Indeed, the social cost of the inventor’s time may far exceed the out-
of-pocket expenses of litigation. 
 
If the inventor could credibly threaten to enforce, the corporation would conduct a search.  
The reason is that the cost to the corporation if it searches is $40 + (¼)($100 + 120) = 
$95, and the expected liability to the corporation if it does not search is (¾)($100 + $120) 
= $165.  But in the absence of a credible threat to enforce, the corporation will not search 
among the previous patents.  Unlike the ski resort example, the injurer in this case has no 
incentive to take care (i.e., search), even though care is socially desirable.  Since the 
inventor cannot credibly threaten to sue, the value of the patent to him is equal to the 
potential income discounted by the probability of infringement, $25.   
 
Suppose a patent troll approaches the inventor, and the troll’s cost of litigation is $20.  
Since the troll’s threat to litigate would be credible, the troll would be willing to pay as 
much as (¼)($100 – $20) = $20 for the inventor’s potential infringement claim.  In a 
sense, the troll would subrogate the owner’s infringement claim.  The inventor would be 
willing to sell the right to sue for infringement for any positive price, since it is worthless 
to him in the absence of a credible threat to litigate. 
 
Once gaining ownership of the infringement suit right, the troll could hold on to it, or sell 
the potential claim to the potentially infringing corporation.  The corporation would be 
willing to pay as much as $95 for the potential claim.  The efficient outcome is the one in 
which the troll sells the claim to the corporation.  This is a transaction that would be 
unavailable to the inventor because his threat to litigate is not credible. 
 
An alternative contract between the inventor and the troll could involve the inventor 
selling the patent entirely to the troll, which is probably more common in reality.  I 
examined a more limited contract in which the inventor sells only his potential 
infringement claim primarily because that is easily compared to the ski resort example 
considered earlier.  However, in many real world settings, the litigation rights connected 
to the patent constitute the most valuable feature of the patent.  Given this, my initial 
assumption that the troll purchases only the litigation rights from the inventor may 
accurately capture the essential features of transactions among inventors and trolls in 
many real world instances. 
 
If the inventor sells the entire patent to the troll, he would demand a price of at least $25.  
The value of the patent to the troll is equal the associated income stream discounted by 
the probability of infringement (given credibility of enforcement) plus the value of the 
tort claim in the event of infringement: (¾)($100) + (¼)($100 – $20) = $95.  Since the 
patent is more valuable in the hands of the troll than in the inventor’s hands, the troll may 
choose to purchase the patent from the inventor rather than purchase the right to sue for 
infringement. 
 
D. Transaction Costs 
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The efficient market examined in the previous part may not be observed if transaction 
costs make it difficult to arrange trades.  I will assume here that third-party enforcers 
cannot sell rights directly to injurers.  In other words, victims cannot exchange rights with 
injurer-alter-ego enforcers who would waive them on behalf of injurers. 
 
If claims cannot be sold to injurer-alter-ego enforcers, then they will all end up in the 
hands of victim-alter-ego enforcers – for example, insurance companies.  As a result, all 
claims will be enforced, even those whose enforcement is not socially desirable.40  In 
addition, since claims will be transferred from victims to more efficient enforcers, some 
dormant rights will also be transferred and enforced. 
 
This is a plausible and important type of market failure for several reasons.  First, once a 
third-party enforcer acquires a victim’s rights, he may have difficulty finding the 
potential injurer or negotiating a waiver agreement.  For example, the medical insurer 
may not be able to identify the potential injurer (or the potential injurer’s insurer) if the 
potential injury is a traffic accident.  Alternatively, even if the third-party enforcer can 
identify the potential injurer, they may be unable to negotiate an efficient waiver 
agreement – say because of externalities among affected parties, or because of 
informational asymmetry.    
 
Second, there may be informational gaps between the victim and the enforcer that result 
in divergent enforcement incentives.  If the victim could negotiate directly with the 
injurer, he may choose to waive his right.  But the enforcer may have incentives that 
differ from those of the victim, and would choose to enforce the right even when 
enforcement is inefficient. 
 
When transaction costs prevent third-party enforcers from transferring potential claims to 
injurers, enforcement will be socially excessive.  Dormant legal rights will be purchased 
and enforced by third-party enforcers, perhaps to the point of eliminating instances in 
which rights that could be efficiently enforced remained dormant.  But rights that would 
be inefficient to enforce could not be extinguished by contract. 
 
Patent Troll Example: Return to the example of Part IV.C.2.  The value of the right to sue 
for infringement, for the inventor, is equal to zero, because the anticipated damage 
judgment would be less than the inventor’s cost of litigation.  Hence, the inventor would 
not sue, and any threat on his part to sue would not be credible.  The value of the right to 
sue for infringement, for the patent troll, is (¼)($100 – $20) = $20.  The potentially 
infringing corporation would purchase the right from the patent troll for any price less 
than $95.  Since the potential infringer could easily buy out the troll’s potential claim, 
litigation in this setting is inefficient.  But if transaction costs prevent such a transfer from 
taking place the troll will sue for infringement, and litigation will occur.   
 
                                                 
40 The following conditions describe this scenario: (p – q)v – x < q(cp + cd)  (victim’s potential claim 
inefficient), qv – qce > 0 (claim profitable to enforcer), (p – q)v – x < q(cd + ce) (enforcer’s suit inefficient). 
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Social welfare could be enhanced by a rule barring the inventor from selling his potential 
claim to the troll.41  However, this conclusion relies in part on this framework’s focus on 
the welfare consequences of litigation.  A broader perspective would consider the 
innovation incentives provided by patents.  If the inventor were prevented from 
contracting with the troll, the value of his patent would be $25.  If the inventor were 
permitted to contract with the troll, the value of his patent would rise to as much as $95 
(the sum of $75 and the value extracted from selling the infringement suit right to the 
troll).  Even though litigation by the troll would be inefficient, the inventor’s payoff from 
innovation would be greater. The innovation benefits from transacting with trolls could 
outweigh the welfare losses generated by their litigation. 
 
E. Mistaken Beliefs 
 
In addition to transaction costs, another source of inefficiency is mistaken beliefs.  
Victims might mistakenly believe that all claims would be allocated to real enforcers 
(rather than to the injurers) and therefore sell their claims too cheaply.42   
 
Suppose victims assume that their claims will be allocated by a third-party financier to a 
real enforcer or to an injurer in accordance with their shares of the population of 
enforcers, but the claims are allocated only to injurers.  Now exchange would occur when 
 
       δpv + (1 – δ)qv – qcp  <  x + qv + qcd 
 
which is equivalent to 
 
    δ(p – q)v  <  x + qcd + qcp   .              
 
Thus, there may be instances in which victims who would not sell to injurers (because 
their asking prices exceed the offer prices of injurers) choose to do so because they 
mistakenly assume that the rights will be allocated to a real enforcer.  In this setting, the 
market in legal rights could reduce social welfare because some rights are inefficiently 
extinguished. 
 
F. Sham Enforcement and Agency Costs Generally 
 
                                                 
41 This example could explain the empirical findings of the Bessen, Ford and Meurer study of patent trolls, 
Bessen, James E., Meurer, Michael J. and Ford, Jennifer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 
Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-45, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930272. 
42 This strikes me to be a more plausible assumption about informational asymmetry than the assumption 
that victims know more about their claims than do third party financier-litigators.  For this reason I have not 
emphasized the lemons problem discussed by Abramowicz, supra note 6.  Most victims know very little 
about the value of their claims.  Shukaitis, supra note 6, at 348, worries that unsophisticated victims would 
be taken advantage of by financiers.  Indeed, one argument in favor of third-party financing is that it will 
enable victims to get information on the value of their claims from financiers.  Rubin makes the related 
point that a contingency fee arrangement reveals information about the value of the claim.  See Rubin, 
supra note 6, at 4-5. 
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I will continue to consider the case in which rights are transferred to third-party 
enforcers, and transaction costs prevent those enforcers from transferring rights to 
injurers.  As a result, legal rights are transferred only to third-party enforcers.  In this part 
I will assume that some third-party enforcers choose not to enforce rights promptly; they 
engage in sham enforcement.  
 
The key feature of sham enforcement is that it is not done with sufficient vigor to induce 
injurers to take care.  Injurers understand that the threat of liability from sham enforcers 
is not strong enough to give them an incentive to take care. 
 
Why might sham enforcement be observed?  Once the third-party enforcer owns the 
victim’s legal rights, he may prefer to see more injuries rather than less, because his 
revenue increases as the rate of injury increases.  It may be profitable for an enforcer to 
purchase claims, and then reduce his level of enforcement to the point that the injurer no 
longer has an incentive to take care. 
 
To see the sham enforcement problem in terms of the model, let  represent the 
frequency with which the sham enforcer brings an action against an injurer.  The revenue 
for the sham enforcer is 
 
                p (v – ce)  . 
 
The revenue for the victim-alter-ego enforcer is q(v – ce).  If the rate of enforcement is 
such that p  > q then the enforcer might profit by purchasing victims’ claims and 
enforcing less diligently. 
 
Since the sham enforcer’s threat of action will not induce the injurer to take care, the 
expected cost to the injurer if he does not take care must be less than the expected cost if 
he does take care: 
 
                p (v + cd) < x + q (v + cd) 
 
This means that even with the threat of a lawsuit from the sham enforcer, the injurer will 
still choose not to take care, because it is cheaper in expectation to pay off the damage 
claims than to take care.  
 
As long as care is socially desirable, sham enforcement reduces welfare relative to real 
enforcement.  To see this, note that the under sham enforcement, society’s costs are 
 
                       pv + p (cd + ce) . 
 
Under real enforcement, society’s costs are 
  
                     x + qv+ q(cd + ce) . 
 
Real enforcement is preferable to sham enforcement if 
 25
 
 (p – q)v – x > (q – p)(cd + ce) , 
 
which is true as long as care is socially desirable.  Thus, sham enforcement may be 
profitable to third-party enforcers while harmful to social welfare.  This is valid even if 
real enforcement is inefficient relative to no enforcement.  It should be clear that sham 
enforcement is inefficient relative to no enforcement, because sham enforcement involves 
spending resources on enforcement with nothing to show for it in terms of deterrence.43 
 
Under what conditions would a patent troll have an incentive to engage in sham 
enforcement under the assumptions of the example of Part IV.C.2?  If the troll sets his 
rate of enforcement at 35 percent, he will profit from sham enforcement.  The value of 
the infringement suit right under real enforcement is (¼)($100 - $20) = $20.  The value of 
the infringement suit right under sham enforcement is (¾)(.35)($100 - $20) = $21.  Thus, 
the troll who intends to engage in sham enforcement will outbid the troll who intends to 
really enforce the inventor’s rights.  Moreover, if the troll sets his rate of enforcement at 
35 percent, then if the corporation does not search its liability will be equal to 
(¾)(.35)($100 + $125) = $57.75; and if the corporation searches its cost will be $40 + 
(.35)(¼)($100 + $120) = $59.25.  Hence, the corporation will not search among prior 
patents.  Since sham troll enforcers would earn greater profits than real enforcers, sham 
enforcers would enter the market more frequently and displace real enforcers.  The 
tendency to engage in sham enforcement is probably dampened by the practice of trolls 
owning the patent rather than merely the enforcement right. 
 
Sham enforcement is just a special case of “agency costs” in enforcement.  Third-party 
litigators may have interests that differ from those of victims, and those interests may 
lead the third parties to engage in conduct that reduces the welfare of victims or of 
society in general.  Third-party enforcers may choose to trade off the deterrence or 
compensation interest in exchange for enhancing the value of damage claims, gaining 
favorable precedent, biasing courts by influencing judicial appointments and elections, or 
outright bribery of judges. 
 
G. Externalities from Enforcement 
 
Closely related to the problem of agency costs is that of external effects from 
enforcement.  If enforcement of the victim’s legal right by a third party imposes a cost on 
another party, then third-party enforcement could easily be socially undesirable.  
Suppose, for example, that the third-party enforcer gets a private benefit from 
enforcement because it allows him to impose costs on a rival.  In this scenario, relatively 
high-cost enforcers could outbid low-cost enforcers and drive inefficient litigation 
through the courts. 
                                                 
43 An alternative version of sham enforcement is where the enforcer surreptitiously inflates damages, 
through fraud or through manipulation of the courts.  In the first period, the injurer has no incentive to take 
care given the expected level of damages and the observed rate of enforcement.  In an enforcement action 




Return to the patent example of IV.C.2.  Suppose there are two corporations potentially 
affected by the inventor’s work; an “entrant” corporation that is in the process of 
developing an infringing invention, and an “incumbent-monopolist” corporation that 
could protect its monopoly in a specific market by gaining control over the inventor’s 
invention.  The incumbent-monopolist would bid on the inventor’s right for the purpose 
of obstructing entry by the entrant corporation.  By gaining ownership of the inventor’s 
invention, the incumbent-monopolist can threaten infringement litigation and demand 
excessive royalties in order to block entry into its market by the entrant corporation.  Let 
the benefit the incumbent gets from obstructing entry be $200.  Then, if the incumbent’s 
litigation cost is $80, the incumbent would bid as much as $200 + (¼)($100 – $80) = 
$205 for the inventor’s infringement suit right.  The incumbent would prevail in a 
bidding war for the patent and would vigorously enforce it against the entrant 
corporation.  Assuming that the $200 gain to the rival corporation largely reflects a 
transfer from consumers, the resulting litigation would reduce society’s welfare. 
 
H. Exchange in a Securitization Market 
 
I examined (in Part C) a market in which victims, third-party financiers, and injurers were 
able to enter into fully-informed agreements for the exchange of legal rights.  Under these 
conditions, an efficient market in legal rights would be observed.  Such a market 
enhances society’s wealth by enabling the enforcement of legal rights whose enforcement 
is socially desirable, and facilitating the waiver of rights whose enforcement is not 
socially desirable. 
 
But a real market in legal rights may not be characterized by full information and low 
transaction costs.  Suppose, for example, victims cannot distinguish injurer-alter-ego 
enforcers from victim-alter-ego enforcers.  A victim comes to the market and offers to 
sell his legal right.  What price would he set?  Since the victim knows there is a risk that 
the purchaser could be the injurer-alter-ego, he will set a high price, and the only 
purchaser would be the injurer-alter-ego.  No rational victim would set a low price, 
because his right would be snapped up right away by an injurer-alter-ego.  In this 
scenario, the only rights exchanges that would be observed would be waivers.  Moreover, 
if there is heterogeneity in the potential injuries of victims, then there could be a process 
of adverse selection in which the market collapses.  Only the most severe injurer types 
and their representatives would enter the market to purchase legal rights.  Only the 
victims with the highest asking prices would offer to sell their rights. 
 
Given the difficulties that arise as soon as we step away from the full information market 
examined earlier, I will examine a simple securitization market here.  In this part I 
consider a market in which claims are transferred and pooled into a security.  In some 
respects this is an ideal setting in which to examine the potential gains from a market in 
legal claims.  If legal barriers to third-party funding of litigation are removed, and 
commerce in legal claims continues to expand, the market could operate in a manner 
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equivalent to other established securitization markets, such as the mortgage-backed 
securities market.44 
 
Consider the case in which legal claims are pooled into a security, auctioned off to a 
third-party financier, and then allocated by the financier in equal shares among enforcers.  
This is equivalent to the mandatory exchange market suggested by Abramowicz.45 It is an 
ideal market to consider because it would not be distorted by adverse selection.  The 
mandatory exchange market is equivalent to one in which matches between victims and 
enforcer types occur randomly.   
 
Under the mandatory sale and random allocation system, offer prices will be determined 
by the average valuations among the two types of enforcer.  The victim would not know 
whether the person purchasing his claim is his own alter ego, or an injurer.  Similarly, 
third-party enforcers – consisting of victim-alter-egos and injurers – would acquire 
claims in proportion to their representation among enforcers. 
 
Under the securitization arrangement, the maximum bid for a claim would be  
  
        δ(x + qv + qcd) + (1 – δ)q(v – ce).           (8) 
 
The claims would be traded in this market as long as the maximum bid exceeds the offer 
price, which means that    
 
              δpv +  (1 – δ)qv – qcp  <  δ(x + qv + qcd) + (1 – δ)q(v – ce) 
 
This implies, in turn, that legal claims will be traded in the securitization market if  
 
           δ[(p – q)v – x – q(cd + cp)]  < (1 – δ)q(cp – ce).            (9) 
 
Thus, there are two reasons securitized claims will be exchanged: the existence of claims 
that would be inefficient to enforce and the existence of more efficient enforcers than the 
original victims.  If litigation is welfare-reducing, the left-hand side of (9) would be 
negative, because the deterrence benefit would be less than the cost of litigation (see (2), 
though reversed).  If third-party enforcers are especially efficient litigators, as assumed 
earlier, the right-hand side of (9) would be positive.  Thus, the less efficient litigation is 
in general, and the more efficient third-party enforcers are relative to original victims, the 
greater the potential wealth created by the market in legal claims. 
 
One implication of this analysis is that even if litigation is efficient (waivers would 
reduce social welfare), the exchange of legal claims could enhance wealth if the relative 
efficiency advantage of third-party enforcers is sufficiently great.  The auction regime in 
which this would be observed is one in which the efficiency gain from third-party 
enforcement is so great that it swamps the welfare loss from inefficient waivers.  In more 
practical terms, some victims would have their potential claims forfeited under conditions 
                                                 
44 See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 6, at 383. 
45 See Abramowicz, supra note 6, at 757. 
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that reduce society’s welfare, while other victims would have their claims enforced at 
much lower cost by a real enforcer. 
 
The other possible extreme case of an efficient market in claims is where litigation is 
inefficient and third-party enforcers are also relatively inefficient.  However, the 
inefficiency of litigation is so great that the welfare gain from extinguishing some 
potential claims exceeds the loss from permitting more costly enforcement of non-
extinguished claims. 
 
Although I have offered this model as a hypothetical device to use to examine the likely 
results of third-party funding with securitization, one might ask whether there are any real 
markets in existence that this model might describe.  One example is the purchase of 
patents, or of patent portfolios, or the securitization of royalties from patents or other 
types of intellectual property.  A patent can be purchased by the likely infringer, which is 
equivalent to waiving the patent holder’s right.  If a third-party financier were to purchase 
a security based on a patent (or patents) he would have to consider the probability that the 
patent would be sold to the likely infringer in evaluating its price. 
 
V. Exchange of Matured Claims 
 
The analysis of the previous parts applies to the sale of matured legal claims, with some 
modifications.46  In this setting, the transfer of rights is assumed to have no affect on the 
decision to take care, because it occurs after the injury happens.  Of course, if the victim 
and injurer knew beforehand that the claim would be transferred, there might be an 
impact on the decision to take care, but I will assume that the parties cannot predict ex 
ante whether the claim will be transferred. 
 
Let Pp be the plaintiff’s prediction of the likelihood of a verdict in his favor, and Pd be the 
defendant’s prediction of the same probability.  Suppose the third-party enforcer has a 
different prediction of the likelihood of plaintiff victory, Pp.  The third-party enforcer and 
the victim will arrange a mutually beneficial exchange of the matured claim if Ppv – cp < 
Ppv – ce, or equivalently 
 
   (Pp – Pp)v < cp – ce             (10) 
 
Thus, the two factors driving the purchase of matured claims are the third party 
enforcer’s greater likely success in litigation, and the third party’s cost advantage in 
litigation.  Note that the third-party enforcer does not need to have both a cost advantage 
in litigation and a greater likelihood of success for a claim to be purchased – an 
advantage on one score can offset a disadvantage on the other. 
 
The plaintiff would settle his claim if Ppv – cp < Pdv + cd, or equivalently (Pp – Pd)v < cp 
+ cd, which is the well known Landes-Posner-Gould settlement condition.  The third-
party enforcer who purchases the plaintiff’s claim would settle if  
                                                 
46 For an insightful discussion of markets in matured legal claims, see Peter Charles Choharis, A 
Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 Yale J. on Reg. 435 (1995). 
 29
 
       (Pp – Pd)v < ce + cd ,           (11) 
 
assuming that the defendant’s prediction of the likelihood of plaintiff success remains the 
same after the claim is transferred to the third-party enforcer.  If the third-party enforcer 
is a more successful litigant (Pp > Pp), he will wish to pursue litigation when the victim 
would prefer to settle; in addition when the third-party enforcer is a more efficient 
enforcer, he will prefer to litigate when the victim would choose to settle the claim.  It 
follows from (11) that either one or both of these conditions will be satisfied whenever 
the third party enforcer acquires the victim’s claim in a mutually beneficial exchange, 
which implies the following proposition (see Appendix for proof). 
 
Whenever a matured legal claim is sold to a third-party enforcer, the third party enforcer 
will be more likely to litigate (less likely to settle) than is the victim, provided that the 
transfer does not affect the defendant’s prediction of the likelihood of plaintiff victory. 
 
If the defendant’s prediction of the likelihood of success changes as a result of the 
transfer, the conclusion that third-party litigation necessarily reduces the likelihood of 
settlement no longer holds.  Suppose, after the claim is transferred, that the defendant’s 
estimate of the likelihood of plaintiff success changes to Pd, where Pd > Pd.  The reason 
this might occur is that the defendant may realize that the third-party funded litigator has 
a greater likelihood of success.47  Under this assumption, settlement would occur if 
 
       (Pp – Pd)v < ce + cd .           (12) 
 
In this case it is unclear whether settlement is less likely to occur under third-party 
litigation.  The gap between expected judgments may shrink after the defendant adjusts 
his expectation, which would enhance the probability of settlement.  Thus, if the transfer 
of the matured claim alters the defendant’s prediction of the likelihood of plaintiff 
victory, the probability of settlement may or may not increase under third-party 
enforcement. 
 
Some of the case law and commentary on third-party financing have focused on the 
possible existence of different litigation incentives for third-party enforcers and original 
victims, and have suggested that this possibility presents a reason for prohibiting the 
transfer of legal claims.  In particular, one critique of third-party enforcement is that it 
will reduce the rate of settlement.48  As this analysis shows, third-party funding of 
matured legal claims, along with third-party control over litigation, will reduce the rate of 
settlement if defendants’ trial-outcome expectations are not affected by it; and otherwise 
the effect on settlement frequency is ambiguous. 
 
                                                 
47 The plaintiff may disclose the third-party funding arrangement in order to persuade the defendant that it 
has a valid claim, see Garber, supra note 22, at 15. 
48 See Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 2003); Jason Lyon, 
Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 58 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 571, 
576, 595-99 (2010). 
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Given that third-party funding is likely to increase the frequency with which matured 
claims are litigated, the more important question is whether such a change would enhance 
social welfare.  A reduction in the rate at which disputes settle, considered alone, tells us 
little about the welfare implications of third-party funding.  The welfare implications 
depend on the extent to which the deterrence benefit from litigation exceeds the total cost 
of litigation.  This is an empirical question, and its answer will depend on the specifics of 
the environment in which litigation may arise. 
 
If the sale of a matured claim is foreseeable to victims and injurers, then the price-setting 
incentives examined in the previous parts of this paper would affect the terms of any 
contracts between potential victims and potential injurers.  For example, suppose 
employees know that any matured tort claims against their employer would be assigned 
to injurer-alter-ego enforcers.  The employees would demand compensation, in their 
employment contracts, for waiving their tort claims against the employer.  The issues 
examined previously would apply fully to the case of matured claims. 
 
VI. Discussion and Implications 
 
In the preceding parts of this paper I have identified the benefits and costs of third-party 
financed litigation.  The benefits are easier to see if they are considered in light of the 
circumstances in which litigation is (or is not) socially desirable. 
 
The potential social benefits of third-party finance and litigation can be traced to several 
sources.  First, to the extent third-party enforcers are more efficient litigators than are 
original victims, social welfare can be enhanced through a reduction in the resources 
devoted to litigation.  Second, third-party enforcers, because of their superior efficiency 
in litigation, may be willing to enforce socially efficient rights (i.e., potential claims for 
which the deterrence benefit from enforcement is greater than the total cost of litigation) 
that would otherwise not be enforced.  The third source of welfare gain is, perhaps 
counterintuitively, from waiving potential claims.  If victims cannot waive legal rights 
easily, sale to third parties may facilitate waiver,49 which would be socially desirable in 
the case of inefficient legal rights. 
 
The settings in which more vigorous enforcement would be observed are those in which 
the cost of litigation, for the plaintiff, is likely to exceed the expected value of the award.  
A third party enforcer who can litigate more cheaply would have an incentive to purchase 
potential claims of this sort.  For example, the vast majority of instances of medical 
negligence do not result in litigation,50 probably because most victims of adverse medical 
events do not have the time, money, or inclination to sue their doctors.  The settings in 
which third party litigators would purchase potential claims and then waive them are 
                                                 
49 Bond, supra note 19, at 1322, proposes allowing defendants to purchase claim without noting that it 
would be equivalent to permitting waivers.  The purchase of matured claims by injurers would be 
equivalent to settlement. 
50 A. Russell Localio, et al.,The Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events due to 
Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 New England Journal of Medicine 245-
251 (1991). 
 31
generally those in which the expected injuries are small relative to the cost of avoiding 
them.  Cooter suggested the example of a privately arranged no-fault automobile 
insurance regime.51  A third party litigator, in this case an insurance company, would 
purchase potential tort claims for traffic accidents and waive them.  Since fault liability 
does not seem to affect driver care greatly,52 the dominant effect of waiving probably 
would be a reduction in transaction and litigation costs. 
 
One could argue that the benefit from enhancing enforcement of socially efficient rights 
that would otherwise not be enforced (because they are unprofitable) is limited today 
because the class action device already allows many of these claims to be brought to 
court.53  But the class action device probably does not capture all of the potential claims 
that are both efficient and unprofitable.  In addition, the third-party enforcement system 
provides the advantage of guaranteed compensation to original victims, which enhances 
the likelihood that only efficient claims of class harm will be pursued.54 
 
A fourth source of welfare gain, not explicitly incorporated into the model of this paper, 
is the reallocation of risk.55  The original victim may be risk averse and the financier 
spreads risk across a portfolio of investments.  When the victim sells his claim to the 
financier, social welfare is enhanced by the reallocation of risk from a risk-averse party to 
a risk-neutral party. 
 
A fifth potential gain is the prospect of greater alignment between the interests of 
attorneys and those of plaintiffs.56  Third-party financiers, because they are likely to 
know more about the strengths and weaknesses of litigators than will ordinary victims, 
will have incentives to channel lawsuits to the most effective litigators, and to monitor 
those litigators.  A litigation funder, such as Juridica Investments, can validate the quality 
of a claim for investors without raising the suspicions that lawyers might raise under the 
same conditions, because the litigation funder is likely to have incentives that are closely 
aligned with those of investors, and of plaintiffs.57  In class litigation settings, the 
requirement that potential or actual claims be purchased would eliminate the worst 
features of class action and derivative litigation, such as races to the courthouse and 
                                                 
51 Cooter, supra note 6, at 385. 
52 Studies on the effects of no-fault have been mixed, and suggest a modest effect at most.  For a thorough 
review of the empirical literature, see Marco, Alan C. and Salvietti, Casey, What Does Tort Law Deter? 
Precaution and Activity Levels in No-Fault Automobile Insurance, pp. 7-10 (November 2007), 2nd Annual 
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=998741.  
53 Rubin, supra note 6, at 8. 
54 If third-party enforcers did not have to compensate victims in full, there is a significant risk that those 
enforcers would “sell out” their claims.  On such collusive settlements, see Susan P. Koniak & George M. 
Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1111-15 (1996). 
55 Shukaitis, supra note 6, at 334; Molot, supra note 9.  Although risk allocation is not incorporated into the 
model examined in this paper, one could view the litigation efficiency gain from third-party enforcement as 
arising from the risk allocation advantage. 
56 See, e.g., Max Schanzenbach & David Dana, How Would Third Party Financing Change the Face of 
American Tort Litigation? (Third Party Financing of Litigation Roundtable, Searle Ctr., Nw. Univ. Law 
Sch. Sept. 24-25, 2009), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/ 
Schanzenbach_Agency%20Costs.pdf.  
57 See, e.g., Garber, supra note 22, at 15. 
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collusive settlements.  If class action attorneys had to gain the consent of each victim to 
sue on his behalf, races to the courthouse would not be observed.58  The problems of 
collusive settlements could be greatly reduced if class action lawyers had to purchase the 
claims of victims (an opt-in system).59   
 
But there are also costs that would be associated with a third-party finance and 
enforcement system.  Although I will focus here on implications of the analysis of 





In any system in which the control of legal rights is shifted to a third party, there is a risk 
of leakage: control will fall into the hands of the actors responsible for the injuries 
underlying the potential claims.  Rights that fall into the hands of potential injurers will 
be effectively waived, since the injurers are not going to sue themselves. 
 
How could leakage occur?  If a third party offers to finance the claims of a potential 
victim, the same third party could be controlled by another party who is likely to be the 
source of the victim’s injury claims.  Suppose, for example, firm A purchases potential 
legal claims of employees of firm B.  If firm A is the wholly owned subsidiary of firm B, 
then employees will have effectively waived their claims by selling them to firm A.  Such 
a transparent case of leakage may be unlikely, but a market in which potential legal 
claims are sold could result in complicated transactions and ownership structures.  Within 
such a market, leakage might occur without being obvious. 
 
Of course, leakage could be efficient.60 If the underlying potential claim is inefficient, 
then a transfer to the injuring party enhances social welfare.  However, an opaque or 
complicated transfer mechanism (e.g., securitization) might lead to contingent claims 
going to a combination of genuine enforcers and injurers.  In such a market, it is possible, 
depending on how the transfer mechanism is arranged, for contingent claims to be 
transferred with the result being harmful to social welfare.  
 
B. Prosecution of Inefficient Claims 
 
                                                 
58 The race to the courthouse famously observed in class action and shareholder derivative litigation is an 
effort to gain ownership of claims.  If a litigator gained ownership directly, he could take the time to 
develop and research his case rather than running directly to the courthouse with a shoddily researched 
complaint. 
59 If class action lawyers had to pay each victim a non-trivial amount of money to gain control over his 
legal claim, then the lawyers would need to earn a substantial judgment in order to make a profit on the 
class action lawsuit.  At present, civil procedure rules permit class action lawyers to take effective 
ownership of claims, giving victims an opt-out right.  An alternative to the “taking” of control over claims 
by class action lawyers would be an auction system as proposed in Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, The Plaintiffs Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1 (1991). 
60 For the argument that leakage should be prevented under a system in which potential claims are 
assignable, see Marks, supra note 6. 
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Third-party enforcement may lead to more frequent prosecution of inefficient claims.  I 
considered examples in which this occurs because transaction costs prevent third-party 
enforcers from transferring claims to injurers.  Also, third-party enforcers may have 
constraints and interests that differ from those of the original victims, and these 
differences could lead to the prosecution of inefficient claims.  Such differences are likely 
for several reasons: the inability of the original victim to foresee future costs associated 
with litigation, informational asymmetry, and a special, perhaps idiosyncratic, gain to the 
third-party enforcer. 
 
Take the employment setting as an example.  A potential victim might sell his unmatured 
legal claims to a third-party financier/enforcer without having a clear sense of exactly 
what those claims might be.  In a later period, the third-party enforcer discovers evidence 
that he could use to bring a successful discrimination claim against the victim’s 
employer.  Suppose, for example, the enforcer discovers that the employer has promoted 
several individuals whose credentials are less than those of the victim’s.  The victim, 
asked whether to pursue the discrimination claim, might decline because he expects to 
leave his current employer and would rather not enter the job market under the cloud of a 
discrimination lawsuit.  The enforcer, however, has different payoffs and may find it 
profitable to pursue the claim.  If the victim had foreseen the possibility of this type of 
claim, he would have sold his legal rights for a higher fee, or perhaps not have sold them 
at all.  But after the rights are sold, he has relinquished the right to control the lawsuit. 
 
There are plenty of examples today of lawsuits that have a negative payoff for the victim 
and positive payoff for the attorney.  Koniak and Cohen criticize class action settlements 
in which class victims receive coupons, or other seemingly trivial awards, while 
plaintiffs’ attorneys receive legal fees in the millions of dollars.61  These are negative 
payoffs when victims receive worthless awards and lose the ability to sue for real injuries 
that have been compensated in theory by the class award.  Another setting in which 
negative payoffs may be observed is where members of the class suffer different amounts 
of harm, and the attorney’s fee arrangement imposes a fixed charge on each victim.62  
The examples from Koniak and Cohen suggest that class action attorneys already have 
incentives that diverge from those of at least some of the victims they represent.  Class 
action attorneys are, in effect, third party litigators – the significant difference is they do 
not have to purchase their claims from victims.  
 
Yet another scenario in which socially inefficient rights are likely to be pursued by third-
party enforcers is where the enforcer gets a special gain from pursuing the injurer in 
                                                 
61 Koniak & Cohen, supra note 54, at 1053-55.  Coupons have been criticized because they are often 
ignored by consumers.  However, coupons as a remedy in antitrust cases may be efficient, see Polinsky, A. 
Mitchell and Rubinfeld, Daniel L., A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies (October 2007). 
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 23, Issue 3, pp. 653-661, 2007. 
62 Koniak and Cohen describe the settlement in a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of more than 
300,000 customers against BancBoston for allegedly requiring its customers to keep more money in their 
mortgage escrow accounts than it had a right to demand, see Koniak & Cohen, supra note 54, at 1058, 
1061.  In at least one case, attorney’s fees were allegedly more than 4,000% of the recovery amount.  
Koniak & Cohen, supra note 54, at 1067.  The case is Hoffman v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp, No. 91-
1880 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Jan. 24, 1994). 
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court.  Suppose the financier purchases potential claims against its main competitor in the 
product market – for example, Coke purchases the potential legal claims of Pepsi 
employees.  Welfare gains would be observed when Coke pursues efficient employment-
related rights against Pepsi that would otherwise not be pursued by Pepsi employees.  
However, there is a clear risk that Coke would pursue inefficient potential claims solely 
for the purpose of damaging its rival.   
 
Competition would spur firms to purchase claims against their market rivals.  A firm that 
refused to purchase such claims would find itself at a competitive disadvantage relative to 
rivals who had purchased claims against it.  As this process continues, the reputation of 
courts would suffer. 
 
Patent auctions provide concrete examples of the incentive for third-party financiers to 
purchase claims against rivals for anticompetitive purposes.  Technology firms have 
incentives to bid aggressively for the patent portfolios of firms in their sectors, in order to 
use those patents to threaten litigation against upstart rivals that hold thin patent 
portfolios.  Even if the efficient allocation of rights would involve the potential infringer 
acquiring a particular patent, and thereby obtaining a waiver, a competitor might outbid 
the potential infringer because of the benefit it gains from deterring entry.63 
 
C. Informational Disparities  
 
Informational disparities combine with the factors just mentioned (leakage, inefficient 
potential claims) to create numerous opportunities for welfare-reducing litigation.  Take 
the employment example just considered.  The third-party enforcer may be in a better 
position to foresee the possible future discrimination claim at the time he purchases the 
rights from the employee.  The employee, unaware of the possibility of such a claim, 
would choose a price that is well below the level that would compensate him for the 
harms that might arise in the future after selling the claim. 
 
The information problems present difficulties in any effort to construct an efficient 
market for the securitization of potential legal claims.  In a market for legal rights, 
victims are likely to be the least informed parties about the value of their rights.  
Financiers are likely to have an informational advantage because they are likely to know 
more about the characteristics of enforcers than do the victims.  
 
Although informational disparities can be a source of inefficiency in the market, 
competition serves a mitigating force.  If financiers compete for ownership of rights, they 
will bid away all informational rents.  The often-mentioned concern that financiers would 
take advantage of victims by purchasing their claims too cheaply would not be observed 
in a competitive market for legal rights.  However, even though informational rents 
                                                 
63 The best known recent example of this is the auction of Nortel’s patent portfolio, which was awarded to a 
consortium of wireless communications firms that bid $4.5 billion.  The one firm that was outside of the 
consortium was Google, which led to speculation that the consortium intended to use the patent portfolio to 
launch infringement suits against Google’s Android software, see John Letzing, Google: Rivals Are 
Ganging Up, Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 2011, at B4. 
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would be bid away a competitive market, informational disparities would still result in 
inefficient waivers as well as inefficient litigation. 
 
D. Perverse Enforcement Incentives 
 
One feature I have tried to formalize is that the enforcer, after acquiring the rights of 
victims, profits when the probability of harm to the victims increases.  This provides 
enforcers with incentives to enforce opportunistically or to generate additional injuries – 
that is to act as sham enforcers.  Patent trolls are often associated with this activity.  But 
the incentive to engage in sham enforcement is a general characteristic of third-party 
litigation. 
 
One obvious example is where the enforcer purchases the potential claims and then 
observes opportunities for making them more valuable.  Suppose the enforcer purchases 
the potential tort and discrimination claims of a group of employees.  After gaining 
ownership of the claims, the enforcer would have incentives to generate an environment 
for claiming as well as new theories of injury in order to enhance the value of his stock of 
potential claims.64  In addition, the enforcer may have an incentive to ferret out or even to 
fabricate claims that most ordinary people would not consider bringing to court.  
 
Where the claims have been realized (matured claims) the enforcer would have an 
incentive to fraudulently assert a greater level of injury than has actually occurred.  For 
example, numerous instances of fraud have been discovered in the asbestos and silicosis 
class actions, where plaintiffs’ lawyers have arranged for mass screenings of potential 
victims.65  The incentives for fraud would be at least as strong in the setting where third-
party financiers own claims. 
 
Another general opportunity for sham enforcement involves injuries that are trivial 
impositions and do not lead to any serious loss to the victim.  Suppose, for example, that 
the injuries under consideration are common insults.  Care would not be socially 
desirable because the cost of care exceeds the losses to be avoided.  However, the sham 
enforcer may have an incentive to encourage and to pursue these claims in court, 
especially in a regime of strict liability or where the negligence standard may be applied 
erroneously.66  Consider, for example, an item-pricing law that requires grocery stores to 
stamp a price sticker on every single item stocked in the store’s shelves.  Many stores 
might choose not to comply with the law because of its high supply-side costs and 
meager consumer benefits. Indeed, it would be nearly impossible to comply perfectly in a 
market with rapidly changing prices.  A third-party litigator would have an incentive to 
                                                 
64 Lawyers can enhance the value of potential claims by lobbying to influence legislation affecting those 
claims, or supporting the campaigns of legislators or of judges who would favor rules that enhance the 
value of potential claims.  The American Association for Justice (formerly Association of Trial Lawyers of 
America) spends millions each year in lobbying legislatures and supporting candidates for office, see, e.g., 
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000065. 
65 Lester Brickman, Disparities Between Asbestos and Silicosis Claims Generated by Litigation Screenings 
and Clinical Studies, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 513 (2007). 
66 This may be a reflection of the underlying strict liability model. If the standard were negligence, the court 
would reject many of these claims. 
 36
gain ownership of claims from customers allegedly harmed by failures to comply, and to 
encourage additional complaints.  If a third party owned some of the potential claims of 
customers, he may have no incentive to see the store comply with the law, or reach an 
efficient agreement with customers directly.67 
 
The incentive to enhance the value of a portfolio of claims could lead litigation financiers 
to bribe courts to modify decisions or to change the law.  Again, this is an incentive that 
already exists, but lawyers are officers of the courts while financiers are independent of 
the courts.  The combination of judges on public-sector salaries and richly compensated 
finance workers would set the stage for corruption in courts that are vulnerable because 
of lax selection criteria and low compensation of judges.68 
 
The possibility of sham enforcement would require some mechanism for controlling 
agency costs in enforcement.  In the absence of such a mechanism, a market in claims 
could be damaged by excessive entry of sham enforcers.  Adverse selection would appear 
in the form of sham enforcers outbidding real enforcers, and a type of moral hazard 
would be observed in the phenomenon of real enforcers switching to sham enforcement 




This is not the first paper to suggest that the ancient prohibitions on third-party funding of 
litigation should be replaced with a more fine-tuned set of rules that distinguish socially 
beneficial from socially harmful instances of such funding.  Moreover, the common law 
has already adopted the fine-tuning approach.  Many courts have narrowed the scope of 
the prohibitions in order to permit third-party funding of litigation where no foreseeable 
harm was likely to result from the particular arrangement observed by the court. 
 
The key contribution of this paper is to identify the potential sources of welfare gains and 
losses associated with a system of third-party litigation funding.  While previous studies 
have discussed the risk-sharing benefits of a market in claims, I have suggested that the 
social gains should be understood in light of the economics of litigation – specifically the 
divergence between private and social incentives to litigate, and the market mechanisms 
for correcting this divergence.  But this perspective also points to some important sources 
of social cost, such as socially undesirable waivers, socially undesirable litigation, and 
the entry of litigators who have a stake in the generation and continuance of injuries.  
Any empirical assessment of the welfare consequences of expanded third-party funding 
will have to take these costs into account. 
                                                 
67 This is a case where the optimal arrangement would involve the third party waiving the potential claims.  
But if he does not own all of the claims, he may have weak incentives to waive.  This is another case where 
transaction costs may stand in the way of an optimal arrangement. 
68 Perhaps third-party litigation finance would force legislators to raise the compensation of judges, or 
institute more rigorous selection criteria, in order to reduce the risk of corruption.  Of course, simply raising 
pay not be enough to reduce corruption.  Back-loading compensation for judges would be a more efficient 
method of reducing corruption.  On compensation and corruption of public law enforcement officials, see 
Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law, Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, 





In this part I consider a contract between a victim and financier that consists of two 
important terms: the upfront payment and the share of damages that will be given to the 




Consider the case of a waiver agreement between the potential victim and the potential 
injurer which includes a damage sharing provision.  Under this agreement, the victim 
would waive his tort claims, but the defendant would also agree to pay part of the 
damages suffered by the victim in the event of an accident. 
 
Assume that the injurer has no incentive to take care after signing the waiver.  Under 
such an agreement, the victim’s asking price for the waiver would be 
 
    p(1 – π)v – qcp – qπv        (A1) 
 
This expression reflects the loss that will be imposed on the victim when the injurer stops 
taking care, but it also subtracts off the litigation costs the victim would have had to pay 
in litigation (if there were no waiver agreement) and also subtracts off the damage portion 
the victim would have if the potential injurer had taken care. 
 
The maximum price from the potential injurer would be 
 
   x + q(1 – π)v + qcd – pπv        (A2) 
  
which reflects the savings the injurer would get from no longer taking care, and the 
release from a portion of the victim’s damages as well as litigation costs.  However, it 
subtracts off the damage payment that the injurer would have to make under the damage 
sharing agreement. 
 
Using these expressions, a waiver agreement will be entered into if 
 
p(1 – π)v – qcp – qπv < x + q(1 – π)v + qcd – pπv      (A3) 
 
which is equivalent to pv – qcp  < x + qv + qcd.  Thus, in the case of the damage sharing 
agreement, the incentive to waive will be the same as in the case without such an 
agreement.  Given this, I have simplified the analysis in the text by focusing on the 





The discussion in the text of matured claims is easily modified for the case of a damage-
sharing agreement.  The third-party enforcer and the victim will arrange a mutually 
beneficial exchange of the matured claim if Ppv – cp < Pp(1 – π)v – ce, or equivalently 
 
(Pp – Pp(1 – π))v < cp – ce            (A4) 
 
Thus, the two factors driving the purchase of matured claims are the third party’s greater 
likely success in litigation, which must be greater still as the proportion of damages 
shared with the victim increases, and the third party’s efficiency advantage in litigation.   
 
The third-party enforcer who purchases the plaintiff’s claim would settle if  
 
  (Pp(1 – π) – Pd)v < ce + cd.                                (A5) 
 
 
Proposition: Whenever a matured legal claim is sold to a third-party enforcer, the third 
party enforcer will be more likely to litigate (less likely to settle) than the victim.  
 
Proof: Suppose the third-party enforcer would settle the claim, which implies (A5).  If the 
claim was obtained in a mutually beneficial trade, then (A4) holds, which implies ce < cp 
+ Pp(1 – π)v – Ppv.  Substituting this into (A5), yields (Pp – Pd)v < cp + cd.  Thus, any 
legal claim that the third-party enforcer would settle, the victim would settle too.  Now 
suppose the victim would litigate the claim, which implies (Pp – Pd)v > cp + cd.  
Substituting (A4) yields (Pp(1 – π) – Pd)v > ce + cd.  Thus, if the victim would litigate the 
claim, the third-party enforcer would litigate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
